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Abstract
We consider a population of agents that are heterogeneous with respect to (i) their strat-
egy when interacting ng times with other agents in an iterated prisoners dilemma game, (ii)
their spatial location on K different islands. After each generation, agents adopt strategies
proportional to their average payoff received. Assuming a mix of two cooperating and two
defecting strategies, we first investigate for isolated islands the conditions for an exclusive
domination of each of these strategies and their possible coexistence. This allows to define a
threshold frequency for cooperation that, dependent on ng and the initial mix of strategies,
describes the outbreak of cooperation in the absense of migration. We then allow migration
of a fixed fraction of the population after each generation. Assuming a worst case scenario
where all islands are occupied by defecting strategies, whereas only one island is occupied by
cooperators at the threshold frequency, we determine the optimal migration rate that allows
the outbreak of cooperation on all islands. We further find that the threshold frequency
divided by the number of islands, i.e. the relative effort for invading defecting islands with
cooperators decreases with the number of islands. We also show that there is only a small
bandwidth of migration rates, to allow the outbreak of cooperation. Larger migration rates
destroy cooperation.
keywords: migration, cooperation, iterated prisoners dilemma
1 Introduction
Human Migration, i.e. the movement of large numbers of people out of, or into specific geo-
graphical areas, is seen as one of the biggest challenges that face the human societies in the 21st
century. On one hand, part of the human population has reasons to emigrate into countries which
provide a “better” life – on the other hand, industrialized countries cannot sustain their current
situation without the immigration of people. The real problem arises because the “demand” and
the “supply” side cannot be matched. Industrialized countries fear that immigrants do not con-
tribute to their further economic growth but, on the contrary, deplete their wealth by taking
advantage of a social security, health, and educational system which they did not contribute to.
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If we move this problem on the more abstract level of a game-theoretical model, we can distinguish
between two types of agents: those cooperating, i.e. being able to integrate in a society and to
contribute to a common good, namely economic growth, and those defecting, i.e. without the
ability to socially integrate and thus depleting a common good at the cost of the cooperating
agents. Certainly, based on their past experience, agents can adapt, i.e. they can change their
strategy from defection to cooperation and vice versa dependent on the payoff they receive in a
given environment. The question for an industrialized country would be then to define an optimal
immigration rate that (a) does not destroy the common good, and (b) allows agents to adapt to
the assumed cooperative environment within one or two generations, even if they may have not
immigrated with a cooperative strategy.
The problems of cooperation and defection and the payoff-dependent adoption of strategies have
been discussed in the framework of the Prisoner’s dilemma (PD) and the iterated PD (IPD)
game (see Sect. 2). With our paper, we add to this framework the ability to migrate between
different countries (“islands”). Our aim is to reveal optimal conditions for the migration of agents
such that cooperating strategies can take over even on those islands where they were initially
not present.
We note that migration was previously studied in a game-theoretical context by different authors
[6, 10]. Our work differs from these attemts in various respects. First of all, we do not assume
that migration is based on the anticipated success [6, 7] – this shifts the conceptual problem
of the “outbreak of cooperation” to proposing rules with non-local information such that two
cooperators meet at the same place, from which cooperating clusters can grow. We also do not
make migration dependent on local variables such as the number of defectors in the neighborhood
[10] or random choices of “empty” places [6, 10]. In fact, human migration is rarely targeted at
less densely crowded places, it is rather the opposite. Further, we do not assume one-shot games
such as the PD, but instead consider the IPD in which the number ng of repeated interaction as
well as the mix of up to 8 different strategies plays a crucial role.
Eventually, we do not use an agent-based model in which update and migration rules are freely
defined, to study their impact on computer simulations on a lattice. Our approach proposes a
population based model in which subpopulations are defined with respect to (a) their interaction
strategy, and (b) their spatial location. The consideration of separated “islands” allows a coarse-
grained implementation of spatial structures which is in between a lattice or network approach
and a meanfield description. It is known that spatial structures have an impact on the outbreak
of cooperation [11, 15, 16], but their influence varies with other degrees of freedom, such as
update rules, synchronization, interaction topology, payoff matrix.
Therefore, in this paper we adopt mostly standard assumptions about the interaction type (IPD
with ng encounters) and interaction topology (panmictic subpopulations), strategy adoption
(replication proportional to payoff), and migration (fixed fraction of the population). To under-
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stand the basic dynamics, we first investigate “isolated” islands (no migration) to find out about
the conditions for the “outbreak of cooperation” without external influence. This “outbreak” is
defined as the critical point (strategy mix, number of encounters ng) beyond which a whole island
is going to be occupied by cooperating agents, if agents adopt strategies proportional to their
average payoff. Then, we add migration between islands to this dynamics to find out under which
conditions the outbreak of cooperation can be enhanced. It is important to note that migration
does not distinguish between strategies or islands, i.e. there are no better suited strategies for im-
migration, or bad places with high emigration rates – which we consider as artificial assumptions
to explain the “outbreak of cooperation”.
To determine the robustness of our findings, we always consider worst case scenarios, i.e. initial
settings in which most islands have either an entirely defective subpopulation, or at least a
defective majority. We further control for important parameters such as the pool of available
strategies s, the number of interactions ng or the number of islandsK, for which critical conditions
are derived. Our finding that migration is indeed able to boost the outbreak of cooperation is
remarkable both because it is based on minimal assumptions about the dynamics and because
it follows from a quite systematic investigation of the underlying conditions.
2 Rules of the game
2.1 Strategic interaction
Let us investigate a population of N agents divided into subpopulations on K different islands
which imply a coarse-grained spatial structure, i.e. N =
∑K
k Nk. Agents at island k are assumed
to interact with the Nk − 1 other agents on their island (panmictic population). But, in general
we assume that migration between the islands is possible, with the respective migration rates
given by muv. These define the fraction of the agent population at island u that migrates to
island v in a given time interval. Figure 1 shows the case of 3 different locations.
Our model basically considers two different time scales for interaction and migration. We define a
generation G to be the time in which each agent has interacted with all otherNk−1 agents a given
number of times, denotes as ng. Thus the total number of interactions during each generation
in the panmictic population is roughly N2k/2 × ng. At any given time, agent i can interact only
with one other agent in a “two-person game”. But during one generation G, it interacts with all
other Nk − 1 agents ng times (repeated two-person game).
For the interaction, we adopt the well known iterative prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) from game
theory. At each encounter between agents i and j, both have two actions to choose from, either
to collaborate (C) or to defect (D), without knowing the action chosen by their counterpart. The
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Figure 1: Subpopulations Nk (with different strategies) are spatially distributed on k islands
from where they can migrate at rates muv.
outcome of that interaction is described in the following payoff matrix:
C D
C (R,R) (S, T )
D (T, S) (P,P )
(1)
If both agents have chosen to collaborate, then they both receive the payoff R. If one of the agents
chose to defect and the other one to cooperate, then the defecting agent receives the payoff T and
the cooperating the payoff S. If both defect, they both receive the payoff P . In the special class
of Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) games, the payoffs have to fullfil the following two inequations:
T > R > P > S ; 2R > S + T (2)
which are met by the standard values T = 5, R = 3, P = 1, S = 0. This means in a cooperating
environment, a defector will get the highest payoff.
For ng = 1 (“one-shot” game) choosing action D is unbeatable, because it rewards the higher
payoff for agent i no matter if the opponent chooses C or D. At the same time, the payoff for
both agents i and j is maximized when both cooperate. A simple analysis shows that defection
is a so-called evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) in a one-shot PD. If the number of cooperators
and defectors in the population is given by N c and Nd = N −N c respectively, then the expected
average payoff for cooperators will be ac = (R×N c+S×Nd)/N . Similarly the expected average
payoff for defectors will be ad = (T ×N c + P ×Nd)/N . Since T > R and P > S, ad is always
larger than ac for a given number N c, and pure defection would be optimal in a one-shot game.
Even one defector is sufficient to invade the complete population of N − 1 cooperators.
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But in a consecutive game with short memory, both agents, by simply choosing D, would end
up earning less than they would earn by cooperating. Thus, the number of games ng two agents
play together becomes important. This makes sense only if the agents can remember the previous
choices of their opponents, i.e. if they have a memory of nm ≤ ng−1 steps. Then, for the iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD), they are able to develop different strategies based on their past
experiences with their opponents. We note that the IPD game was studied both in the context
of a panmictic population ([1, 4, 5, 12, 14, 23]) and assuming a spatial population structure
[3, 18, 19].
Usually, in an IPD only a one-step memory is taken into accout. Based on the known previous
choice of its opponent, either C or D, agent i has then the choice between eight different strate-
gies. Following a notation introduced in [13], these strategies are coded in a 3-bit binary string[
Io|Ic Id
]
which always refers to cooperation. The first bit represents the initial choice of agent i:
it is 1 if agent i has cooperated, and 0 if it has defected initially. The two other values refer always
to the previous choice of agent j. Ic is set to 1 if agent i chooses to cooperate given that agent
j has cooperated before and 0 otherwise. Id is similarily set to 1 if agent i chooses to cooperate
given that agent j has defected before and 0 otherwise.
Both Ic and Id can be also interpreted as probabilities to choose the respective action given the
knowledge of the previous choice of the opponent, i.e. {0 ≤ Ip, I
d ≤ 1} in the stochastic case.
In the deterministic case considered in this paper, Id and Ic are either 0 or 1. Out of the eight
possible strategies, to keep our results in a tractable manner, we consider the following four
strategies z(s) (s = 1, 2, 3, 4):
z(1) : [1|10] TFT
z(2) : [0|00] ALL−D
z(3) : [1|11] ALL− C
z(4) : [0|01] A− TFT
(3)
These four strategies were also considered originaly in the famous paper by Axelrod & Hamilton
[1]. Hence, we will extend these investigations by later adding migration to the game. We note
that all eight strategies have been discussed in [17]. In this paper we have dropped those variants
that differ only in the first move but then continue as described in the following. The strategies
ALL-D and ALL-C are obvious: for z(2) agent i always chooses to defect regardless of the previous
choices of agent j, z(3) follows likewise. These two strategies represent the limit case of no memory,
i.e. agent i is simply “fixed” as a cooperator or a defector.
The most interesting strategy z(1), known as “tit for tat” (TFT), means that agent i initially
cooperates and continues to do so, given that agent j was also cooperative in the previous move.
However if agent j was defective in the previous move, agent i chooses to be defective, too.
This strategy was shown to be the most successful one in iterated Prisoners Dilemmas [1]. If
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initially two cooperative agents meet, they stay cooperative (forever, in a deterministic game),
this way maximizing their average payoff. This encourages other agents to adopt TFT. Hence,
the “outbreak of cooperation” in a community of N agents occurs as the amplification of a
cooperative initial fluctuation.
The fourth possible strategy z(4) is just the negation of the most successful one, therefore named
Anti-TFT. It means that agent i starts as a defector and continues to be so, as long as it meets
with cooperative agents j, this way receiving the highest possible payoff T . But, if it meets an
agent that has previously defected, it changes its “behavior” to cooperation. This makes some
sense, since the loss in payoff is not that much – P would be just slightly higher than S. On the
other hand, if the colloborative agent meets again with another cooperative agent, the payoff
would be R, which is a much higher gain. So, this strategy, while not making sense in the first
place, may end up with a higher payoff in those cases where defecting and cooperating strategies
are equally present. We will later show that A-TFT in the long run benefits agents playing
ALL-D and therefore will create a more difficult environment for the invasion of cooperation.
I.e. considering all four strategies captures a worst-case scenario for the outbreak of cooperation
which we deem interesting to study (instead of giving rational arguments in favor of A-TFT).
2.2 Dynamics of replication and migration
In this paper, we are interested in how the frequencies of the different strategies would evolve
in the agent community. The fraction of agents choosing strategy z(s) on island k is defined
as f
(s)
k (t) = N
(s)
k (t)/Nk, where the different strategies are given by eq. (3). Similarly, the total
fraction of agents playing strategy z(s) in the whole system, is given as f (s)(t) = N (s)(t)/N . For
the dynamics we may assume that during each generation G every agent behaves according to
a fixed strategy picked up from the pool of possible strategies. This strategy can be changed
only after one generation is completed. The “update” rule for the strategy is simply given by the
success of different strategies during the past generation. As the evaluation criteria, we choose
the average payoff a
(s)
k , each strategy has received during the last generation on island k. This
will be compared with the total average payoff a¯k that gives an estimate of the overall dynamics
on that island:
a¯k(t) =
4∑
s=1
a
(s)
k (t)f
(s)
k (t) ;
4∑
s=1
f
(s)
k (t) = 1 (4)
For the evolution of the frequencies of the different strategies, the following dynamics is postu-
lated:
f
(s)
k (G+ 1) =
a
(s)
k (G)
a¯k(G)
f
(s)
k (G) (5)
It means that in the next generation G + 1 the share of agents choosing a particular strategy
z(s) has grown/shrunk – i.e., strategy z(s) has replicated – according to the relative performance
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of this strategy on island k during the previous generation G. In population dynamics, this is
known as fitness-proportional selection [8], we adopt it here since the relative performance of a
certain strategy can be also interpreted as its fitness.
The dynamics of eq. (5) does not take into account that agents can migrate between the K
islands. For simplicity, we assume that each island k is occupied by the same number of agents
Nk = N/K and migration can occur between between any two islands with a constant and equal
migration rate muv ≡ m/(K − 1). We interpret m ∈ {0, 1} as the total fraction of the agent
population at any given island that migrates to other islands in a given time interval, namely one
generation. In a first approximation, we assume that migration only occurs after a generation is
completed, i.e. at fixed times G, G+ 1.
While the fraction m is fixed (but controlled for, afterwards), the composition of the migrating
subpopulation across the existing strategies z(s) is not. We assume this composition to be pro-
portional to the fraction f
(s)
k of these strategies at island k at the time when generation G is
completed and migration occurs, to affect the dynamics during the next time interval G+1. This
means migration changes the fraction f
(s)
k (G + 1) by an additional amount F representing the
difference between the influx and the outflux of the agents playing strategy z(s):
F
(s)
k (G) = −mf
(s)
k (G) +
m
K − 1
K∑
j=1,j 6=k
f
(s)
j (G) (6)
which defines the complete dynamics by the following set of iterative equations:
f
(s)
k (G+ 1) =
a
(s)
k (G)
a¯k(G)
f
(s)
k (G) + F
(s)
k (G) (7)
Using F(0) = 0 and an equal share f sk(0) for each strategy on each island as initial conditions, the
dynamics is completely determined if we know the respective average payoffs which are derived
in the following section. We note that, in general, the fixpoints of a difference equation may not
characterise its asymptotic behaviour, while it holds for the given simplified case.
2.3 Determining the payoffs of repeated interaction
In a deterministic game, we are able to calculate the average payoff a
(rq)
i that is received by
agent i playing strategy z(r), r ∈ s, ng times with an agent j playing strategy z
(q), q ∈ s. For
s = 1, 2, 3, 4, the results are given in the 4 × 4 payoff matrix of eq. (8). Note that the matrix
is not symmetric, since it gives the average payoff of agent i. r refers to the row and q to the
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column of eq. (8).
ai =
1
ng


ngR S + (ng − 1)P ngR a
(14)
T + (ng − 1)P ngP ngT P + (ng − 1)T
ngR ngS ngR ngS
a(41) P + (ng − 1)S ngT a
(44)

 (8)
where
a(14) = (ng div 4)P +
(ng rem 4)∑
k=1
bk ; a
(41) = (ng div 4)P +
(ng rem4)∑
k=1
ck
a(44) = (ng div 2) (P +R) +
(ng rem 2)∑
k=1
dk (9)
The symbols T, R, P and S refer to the payoff matrix of the 2-person game, eq. (1). Further, we
have used ng = (ng div y) y + (ng rem y), with 0 ≤ (ng rem y) < y. (ng div y) means the integer
part of the division ng/y, i.e. (ng div 4) = 4 for ng = 18; while (ng rem y) means the remainder,
i.e. (ng rem4) = 2 for ng = 18. The constants appearing are defined as follows:
P = T +R+ P + S ; b1 = S; b2 = P ; b3 = T ; b4 = R
c1 = T ; c2 = P ; c3 = S; c4 = R d1 = P ; d2 = R (10)
To verify how the matrix entries of eq. (8) are derived we have provided a number of illustrative
examples shown in A.
With the known average payoff resulting from each possible interaction, the average payoff per
strategy at island k is simply given as:
a
(s)
k =
4∑
r=1
a(rs)f
(r)
k ;
4∑
r=1
f
(r)
k = 1 (s = 1, .., 4) (11)
where f
(r)
k denotes the fraction of agents playing strategy z
(r) at island k and the a(rs) are given
in eq. (8). Stricly speaking, eq. (11) has to consider the fact that an agent does not play against
itself. This would lead to a correction term of the order of a(ss)/N , which is small and therefore
neglected here.
2.4 Calculating the fixpoints
With the above specifications we are now able to solve the dynamic equations with respect to the
fraction of agents f
(s)
k (t) playing strategy z
(s). Here, we are mostly interested in the impact of
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migration on the prevailence of certain strategies, therefore we will discuss first the case without
migration, eq. (5), which should be used as a reference for the case with migration, eq. (7).
Also, we are mostly interested in the stationary solutions of the respective dynamics, i.e. in the
fixpoints f
(s)
k reached after a suffiently large number of generations. Our focus is then on three
issues which crucially determine the long-term outcome:
(a) the initial frequencies of strategies f (s)(0),
(b) the number of repeated interactions, ng, as this enters the payoff matrix, eq. (8) and therefore
affects the average payoff per strategy, eq. (11)
(c) the impact of the migration rate m on the prevailing strategies.
The stationary values of f
(s)
k are reached if the different frequencies do not change anymore in
the new generation. This leads to the stationary condition:
f
(s)
k (G+ 1) = f
(s)
k (G) = f
(s)
k (12)
where f
(s)
k shall denote the stationary (i.e. asymptotic) frequency of strategy z
(s), in contrast to
f
(s)
k (0) that denotes the initial frequency. For the full dynamics which includes migration, eq. (7),
we solve this condition numerically. But for the case without migration, eq. (5), the stationary
condition leads to a¯kf
(s)
k = a
(s)
k f
(s)
k , which reduces to the quite simple expression a¯k = a
(s)
k only
if f
(s)
k 6= 0.
To further discuss the case of isolated islands, we drop the index k. For m = 0 eq. (12) with eq.
(5) basically yields two different types of solutions, which could be either stable or unstable:
(i) the exclusive dominance of any one strategy z(q) (q ∈ s) while all other strategies z(r),
r 6= q, have disappeared, i.e.
f (q) = 1; a¯k = a
(q) and f (r) = 0 for r 6= q (13)
(ii) the co-existence of some (or all) of the strategies z(q), z(r) with the same average payoff a¯,
but probably different frequencies of agents, f (q), f (r), i.e.
4∑
i=1
a(iq)f (i) =
4∑
i=1
a(ir)f (i) (14)
In the deterministic case considered here it solely depends on the initial conditions f (s)(G = 0),
which of the possible stationary solutions will be eventually reached. After we know the basins
of attraction, i.e. the range of possible initial conditions that lead to a given stationary solution
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and the separatrix deviding them, we could tell from the outset which strategies will be adopted
by the population, and which strategies will disappear. Therefore, in the next section we will
calculate the basins of attraction for the case of isolated islands, to compare these later on for
the case of migration which, as we will see, shifts these basins considerably.
3 No migration: Coexistence and dominance of strategies
For isolated islands, condition (12) leads to s = 4 coupled equations, which follow from eq. (4)
with eq. (11). In addition, we have the boundary condition
∑
s f
(s) = 1, which leads to three
independent variables f (1), f (2), f (3). The separatix then appears as a two-dimensional plane in
this three-dimensional space, which will be hard to calculate analytically. In order to elucidate
this multi-dimensional problem, we discuss in B the case of only two possible strategies, where
the separatrix appears as a point in the one-dimensional space, and in C the case of three possible
strategies, where the separatrix appears as a line in the two-dimensional space. Here, we continue
with the full problem of four possible strategies.
Compared to C, strategy z(4) = A-TFT is added which in the long run benefits agents playing
ALL-D and therefore will decrease the basins of attraction of the cooperating strategies. I.e. con-
sidering A-TFT as an additional strategy will create a more difficult environment for the invasion
of cooperation, therefore it will be very interesting to see, under what conditions cooperation
can survive also in the worst case. The stationary solutions for the frequencies f (s) result from
the following set of coupled equations:
a¯ =
4∑
s=1
a(s)f (s) =
4∑
s=1
(
4∑
r=1
a(rs)f (r)
)
f (s)
a¯f (i) −
(
a(i1)f (1) + a(i2)f (2) + a(i3)f (3) + a(i4)f (4)
)
f (i) = 0 (i = 1, 2, 3, 4)
f (1) + f (2) + f (3) + f (4) = 1
(15)
The matrix elements a(rq) can be calculated from eq. (8). With ng = 4 we find the following
stationary solutions:
(i) f (1) = 1, f (2) = 0, f (3) = 0, f (4) = 0 (stable)
f (1) = 0, f (2) = 1, f (3) = 0, f (4) = 0 (stable)
f (1) = 0, f (2) = 0, f (3) = 1, f (4) = 0 (unstable)
f (1) = 0, f (2) = 0, f (3) = 0, f (4) = 1 (unstable)
(ii) f
(1)
thr = 0.2, f
(2)
thr = 0.8, f
(3) = 0, f (4) = 0 (for ng = 4) (unstable)
f (1) = 1.0 − f (3) (0 ≤ f (3) ≤ 1), f (2) = 0, f (4) = 0 (stable)
(16)
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We note that the stationary solutions also cover the results of the two-strategy case, B and the
three-strategy case, C. We find solutions of type (i) where one strategy is exclusively dominating
the whole population. However, the solution of all agents playing z(4) = A-TFT is also an unstable
attractor, because a small perturbation by agents playing either strategy ALL-D or TFT will
lead to the invasion of that respective strategy into the whole A-TFT population. To see this, we
also refer to the payoffs received in the respective interactions, eqs. (21), (22). From the solutions
(ii) that describe the coexistence of strategies we further see that the addition of strategy z(4) =
A-TFT does not lead to new coexisting states compared to the case of two strategies, B and
three strategies, C. There is only a coexistence between strategies z(1) = TFT and z(3) = ALL-C,
which is stable as long as no spontaneous mutations towards ALL-D or A-TFT occur.
The separatrix that distinguishes between the different attractors is in the given case a two-
dimensional plane in the three-dimensional space of independent frequencies with
∑
s f
(s) = 1.
With respect to the cooperative strategy TFT it defines the threshold frequency f
(1)
thr = f
(1)(G =
0) that has to be reached initially, in order to allow the system to converge to a fully cooperative
state, f (1)(G → ∞) = 1. Because of the ng-dependence of the payoff matrix, eqs. (8), (24) f
(1)
thr
strongly decreases with the number of encounters ng, as shown in Fig. 2. In agreement with known
results from evolutionary game theory [5, 16], for a sufficiently large number of interactions the
whole population will adopt the cooperative strategy, this way increasing the average payoff. The
important point to notice here is the quantitative analysis which allows us to determine, for a
given finite number of ng, the threshold initial frequency f
(1)
thr of agents playing TFT, in order
let cooperation invade the whole population. Or else, for a given initial frequency f (1)(0), we are
able to determine the minimum number of interactions, nming , to let the whole population adopt
the TFT strategy.
To get some further insights, we find it more convenient to present two-dimensional graphical
projections of this three-dimensional space, where the separatrix naturally appears as a line. The
most interesting projection is the f (1)− f (2) projection, since it allows us to compare the results
with the previous cases. The results are shown Fig. 3. They have been obtained by numerically
solving eq. (5) for the full range of initial frequencies, 0 ≤ f (s)(0) ≤ 1. In the stationary limit, the
average payoff was then evaluated to find out to which basin of attraction the solution belongs.
The calculation of the basins of attraction in Fig. 3 are done for a fixed number of interactions,
ng = 4, but for a varying initial frequency of agents playing strategy z
(4) = A-TFT. Of course,
this sets limits to the maximum initial frequencies f (1)(0) = 1−f (3)(0) and f (2)(0) = 1−f (3)(0),
therefore in Fig. 3 we have scaled the f (s)(0)-axes by the maximum possible value, which should
be noticed when comparing the figures. For a small initial frequency of A-TFT (Fig. 3 left) we
find the picture rather similar to the case of three strategies shown in C, however the separation
line between the basins of attraction A (defection) and B +C (cooperation) is now a non-linear
function, different from eq. (32).
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Figure 2: Threshold frequency f
(1)
thr = f
(1)(0) of agents playing strategy z(1) = TFT vs. number
of interactions ng between each two agents, in the case of four strategies. For f
(1)(0) ≥ f
(1)
thr ,
the TFT strategy will be adopted by the whole population, while for f (1)(0) ≤ f
(1)
thr the z
(2) =
ALL-D strategy will be adopted by the whole population.
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Figure 3: Basins of attraction, i.e. range of initial frequencies f (s)(0) that lead to a particluar
stable solution, eq. (16), in the case of four strategies. A: adoption of z(2) = ALL-D strategy in the
whole population, B: adoption of z(1) = TFT strategy in the whole population, C: coexistence
of both z(1) = TFT and z(3) = ALL-C strategies. f (3)(0) = 1 − f (1)(0) − f (2)(0), ng = 4. (left)
f (4)(0) = 0.2, (middle) f (4)(0) = 0.5, (right) f (4)(0) = 0.7.
With an increasing initial frequency of A-TFT, we find that the basin of attraction of defection
is naturally decreasing in absolute size, but it is increasing relative to the basin of attraction
of cooperation. That means that an increase in the fraction of agents initially playing A-TFT
always benefits the adoption of the ALL-D strategy, at the end. A similar conclusion can be
drawn also for the number of agents initially playing ALL-C. We notice that with an increasing
initial frequency of A-TFT region C, that describes the coexistence of both strategies TFT and
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ALL-C, ceases to exist, i.e. strategy ALL-C has vanished for the benefit of strategy ALL-D. This
can also be understood by looking at the average payoff matrix, eq. (8). If an agent playing
ALL-D meets with an agent playing ALL-C, it gets the maximum payoff, T , while it gets almost
the maximum payoff (P +(ng− 1)T )/ng when it meets an agent playing A-TFT. Thus, strategy
ALL-D will eventually invade the population of agents playing either ALL-C or A-TFT, or, in
other words, the presence of strategies like ALL-C and A-TFT in the population helps strategy
ALL-D to invade.
Eventually, we have also calculated numerically the relative size of each basin of attraction as
shown in Fig. 4 for two different values of ng = 4 and ng → ∞. Here the relative sizes a, b,
c and d refer to the three-dimensional space of all possible initial conditions (which is different
from Fig. 9 where they refer to the areas A, B and C shown, thus eq. (33) does not apply here).
When ng = 4, the ALL-D basin ’a’ is slightly bigger than the cooperative basin ’d’ as shown in
contrast to figure 10. With ng → ∞, the size of the ALL-D basin ’a’ becomes pretty small as
compared to cooperative basin ’d’.
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
a
ttr
ac
to
r s
iz
e
a b c d
Figure 4: Relative size of the basins of attraction. ’a’ represents the size of the ALL-D basin,
’b’ represents the size of the TFT basin, ’c’ represents the size of TFT+ALL-C basin and ’d’
represents the size of cooperative basin (i.e. b+c). The left bars (shaded area) refer to ng = 4,
while the right bars (black area) refer to ng →∞. Thus, the change indicates the influence of ng
on the size of the basins of attraction.
To conclude this analysis, we have shown for the case of isolated islands (no migration) what
are the critical initial conditions for cooperative strategies, such as ALL-C, TFT to be adopted
by the whole agent population. Dependent on the number of interactions ng, we can tell the
minimum initial frequency of TFT, f (1)(0) that has to be reached to ensure an cooperative
outcome dependent on the initial mix of strategies (details of the two and three strategy case
are provided in B, C). In the limit of small ng, while one may naively assume that an initial
increase of the ALL-C strategy benefits cooperation, at the end, this analysis shows that with
the involvement of A-TFT it eventually benefits defection in the system, which is an interesting
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finding by itself. In the following, we will investigate how this picture changes if we add the
possibility of migration.
4 Migration: The rise and fall of cooperation
4.1 The role of migration
The previous section has shown that an increase of the number of interaction ng always supports
the prevailence of cooperating strategies, such as ALL-C and TFT. Therefore, in the following
we will concentrate the analysis on the critical conditions which occur for small ng. We fix ng = 4
(note that ng = 3 is the threshold number of interaction to allow the replication of cooperating
strategies at all, see B and Figure 2.
To understand how migration affects the existing equilibrium states, let us start with the simple
example shown in Fig. 5. We take the setup of Fig. 1 and consider only two strategies, z(1) =TFT
and z(2) =ALL-D, but different initial conditions on the 3 islands. As the detailed analysis of B
has shown, below an initial frequency f (1)(0) = 0.2 the only stable stationary state is f (1) = 0,
f (2) = 1. Hence, if no migration is possible, with the given initial conditions shown in Fig. 5(i) the
three islands converge into a final state shown in Fig. 5(iia) where ALL-D prevails in two islands,
while in one TFT dominates because that island started from an initial condition above the
threshold. If we however introduce a rather small migration rate of m/2 = 0.04 all three islands
are eventually dominated by the cooperating strategy, TFT, as shown in Fig. 5(iib). Hence, even
with a rather small advantage on one island (f (1)(0) = 0.3 is just above the threshold of 0.2), a
small migration was able to induce a transition toward TFT instead of a relaxation into ALL-D
on all islands.
It is precisely this kind of phenomenon that we would like to understand better regarding the
critical conditions involved. In particular, we concentrate on the impact of the migration rate on
the threshold value of TFT, to still observe the outbreak of cooperation. The results are found
numerically, by iterating the set of eqs. (7), for ng = 4 and K islands that have the same total
number of agents, but different initial strategy distributions.
Fig. 6 shows results of the two strategies case, TFT and ALL-D, for K = 5 and three different
migration rates, in terms of the average payoff a¯k. As explained in B a¯k = 1 means that ALL-D
invades the entire population, whereas a¯k = 3 is achieved when TFT takes over. Fig. 6(left) with
m = 0 is used for comparison only, as it shows the result predicted in B. I.e., three islands which
have a frequency of TFT below the threshold value of 0.2 are taken over by agents playing ALL-
D. The remaining two islands are invaded by TFT. This result changes in Fig. 6(middle), where
we allow migration of m = 0.08 between islands. Then all islands become populated solely by
TFT which is indicated by a¯k = 3. However, if we further increase the migration rate to m = 0.2,
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Figure 5: Migration between the three islands enhances the outbreak of cooperation. (i) Initial
state (G = 0) using two strategies. The defective strategy ALL-D has the majority on all islands.
(ii) Final state (G→∞) (a) without and (b) with a small migration rate. In (a) only one island
has adopted cooperation, in (b) all three islands have adopted cooperation
the opposite result occurs. In this case ALL-D invades all islands as shown in Fig. 6(right) where
a¯k = 1. These results suggest that there exists an optimal range for m that ensures the outbreak
of cooperation, which will be further investigated in the following sections.
4.2 How migration influences cooperation
We continue our discussion for the case of two strategies, TFT and ALL-D, and now assume
that for K = 6 (K − 1) islands are initially dominated by stategy ALL-D, i.e. f
(1)
k (0) = 0 for
k ∈ 2, ..., 6, while the first island k = 1 is initially populated by both TFT and ALL-D, i.e.
0 < f
(1)
1 (0) < 1. We then vary the migration rate m for different initial frequencies f
(1)
1 (0)
to study numerically under which condition the outbreak of cooperation on all islands can be
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Figure 6: Evolution of the average payoff in the K = 5 island model for different migration rates
m: (left) m = 0.0, (middle) m = 0.08, (right) m = 0.2. Parameters: Panmictic population in
K = 5 island model consisting of TFT and ALL-D. Initial frequencies of TFT: f
(1)
1 = 0.3, f
(1)
2 =
0.25, f
(1)
3 = 0.1, f
(1)
4 = 0.18, f
(1)
5 = 0.15 and f
(2)
k = 1− f
(1)
k .
obtained. The results are shown in Fig. 7. For very small m, the average payoff a¯ just reflects
the mix of the initial strategies. But, as the middle part of Fig. 7 shows, for a certain value of
the initial frequency f
(1)
1 (0), we find a spike a¯ = 3 at a particular value of m that indicates the
outbreak of cooperation, thanks to an optimal migration rate. One would assume that increasing
the initial fraction of TFT would further boost cooperation but, as Fig. 7 (right) clearly shows,
the “bandwidth” of optimal migration rates m is rather limited. Precisely, if f
(1)
1 (0) = 0.40 the
bandwidth of optimal migration rates is 0.07 ≤ m ≤ 0.095 which is to be compared to the
maximum bandwidth 0.07 ≤ m ≤ 0.155 for f
(1)
1 (0) = 1. This makes sense because a large
migration rate may have a contrary effect: While cooperative agents are “exported” to other
islands, the same number of defective agents are “imported”, which may reduce the fraction of
TFT below the critical threshold. Hence, there is a nonmonotonous relation between m and the
outbreak of cooperation.
4.3 Calculating the threshold frequency
We are now interested in finding the minimum inital frequency f
(1)
1 (0) that will lead to invasion
of cooperation on all K − 1 islands, when varying the migration rate m. We define this as the
threshold frequency, fKthr:
fKthr(m
K) = min
f
(1)
1
f
(1)
1 (G = 0) (17)
with f
(1)
k (G = 0) = 0 ∀ k ∈ 2, ...,K ; f
(1)
k (G =∞) = 1 ∀ k ∈ K
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Figure 7: Increasing f
(1)
1 (G = 0) leads to increasing bandwidth of m in which cooperation will
emerge in the system. From left to right: (1) f
(1)
1 (G = 0) = 0.31 (2) f
(1)
1 (G = 0) = 0.32 (3)
f
(1)
1 (G = 0) = 0.40 (4) f
(1)
1 (G = 0) = 1.00. Parameters: ng = 4, K = 6
For each fKthr, there exists a specific value of the migration rate m
K ∈ [0, 1] such that the outbreak
of cooperation happens on all islands. mK denotes the the smallest value of the bandwidth of
optimal migration rates shown in Fig. 7. I.e., for fixed ng and a given number of islands K
with the initial conditions specified in eq. (17), there exist a tuple of critical values (fKthr,m
K)
which determine the outbreak of cooperation. The outbreak shown in Fig. 7(middle) for K = 6
is observed for (fKthr,m
K) = (0.32, 0.07). This leads us to the question, how the threshold value
and the critical migration rate change if we change the number of islands.
The results of exhaustive numerical calculations which had to search for the outbreak of coop-
eration on the whole (K, f
(1)
1 (0),m) parameter space are shown in Fig. 8(left). Obviously, for
K = 1 the threshold frequency results from the analysis given in B. If the number of islands
increases, f
(1)
1 (0) has to increase as well, in order to be able to “export” cooperating agents while
still staying above the theshold. This increase, however, is nonlinear in K. Precisely, as can be
verified in Fig. 8,
fKthr = K
3A0 −K
2 (2A0A1) +K (A0A
2
1 +A2) (18)
The values of the constants An depend implicitely also on the payoff matrix, eq. (1), which
defines the comparative advantage of each strategy for reproduction and invasion, subsequently.
Plotting fKthr/K we see that for 2 ≤ K ≤ 6, with every new island added the relative effort to
invade the new one with cooperators decreases, while for K ≥ 6 this effort increases quadrati-
cally with K. However, the effort of invading other islands with cooperators always stays below
the threshold of an isolated island, which is 0.2. This is a direct consequence of the combined
processes of migration and reproduction. Newly arriving cooperative agents will reproduce on
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Figure 8: (left) Threshold frequency fKthr (black line) and relative effort f
K
thr/K (dashed line)
dependent on the number of islands K. Symbols represent results of numerical calculations.
Fitted values of eq. (18) A0 = 0.006, A1 = 4.798, A2 = 0.060. (right) Optimal migration rate
mK dependent on the number of islands K.
the other islands, this way reaching the threshold value the before the next generation is ready
for migration. Hence, diversification of the reproduction sites for cooperating agents lower the
relative effort for the outbreak of cooperation and makes it more favorable.
As a second consequence of the nonlinear dependency, the export of cooperation from one island
to K − 1 other islands is only possible for a limited number of islands, because of the two effects
already mentioned above. I.e. the “export” of cooperating agents and the “import” of defecting
agents both decrease the fraction of cooperating agents below the threshold frequency. Hence, for
the two strategy case discussed here,K = 8 already leads to the collapse of exporting cooperation.
The critical migration rate mK dependent on the number of islands is shown in Fig. 8(right).
We recall that this gives the minimal fraction of the population that has to migrate in order to
allow the outbreak of cooperation on any island. If f
(1)
1 (0) = f
K
thr it is at the same the maximum
fraction to not let cooperation collapse back home, i.e. it is the optimal migration rate (see Fig.
7(middle)
Eventually, one can ask how the outbreak of cooperation (fKthr,m
K) is affected if instead of the
two strategies TFT, ALL-D three or four strategies are considered. In general, the presence of
both ALL-C and A-TFT favors the invasion of ALL-D at the end, whereas the presence of A-
TFT favors the invasion of TFT – thus we can expect that the thresholds are slightly higher or
lower in such cases. A more involved discussion is presented in D.
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5 Conclusions
Before summarizing our findings, we wish to comment on a related strand of literature about
multi-level selection in populations [20, 22]. There, quite similar to the setup presented in our
paper, a population consisting of several groups (subpopulations) was considered where interac-
tion only occurs between agents of the same subpopulation. The fitness of agents was determined
by the payoff obtained from an evolutionary game, simply chosen as a non-iterative Prisoner’s
Dilemma, and their reproduction was assumed to be dependent on their payoff according to a
Moran process [21]. Further a stochastic dynamics was considered.
In addition to these differences (PD, Moran process, stochastic dynamics), also a separate group
dynamics was assumed. Groups can split when reaching a certain size, which denotes a amplified
replication process at the group level. Precisely, groups that contain fitter agents reach the
critical size faster and, therefore, split more often. This concept leads to selection among groups,
although only individuals reproduce. It allows for the emergence of higher level selection (group)
from lower level reproduction (agents). It was shown [20, 22] that cooperation in such a setting
is favored if the size of groups is small whereas the number of groups is large. Migration does
not support the outbreak of cooperation in this model because it favors the invasion of defectors
rather than of cooperators.
In contrast to these investigations, we have contributed to the analysis of evolutionary (deter-
ministic) IPD games in two different domains:
(i) For the meanfield limit, represented by a panmictic population where each agent interacts
with N − 1 other agents ng times, a quantitative investigation of the basins of attraction
was provided. Dependent on the initial mix of two cooperative (ALL-C, TFT) and two
defective (ALL-D, A-TFT) strategies and the number of interactions ng, we could derive
the critical conditions (threshold frequencies) under which the outbreak of cooperation
can be expected in a panmictic population. A detailed analysis of the two, three and four
strategy cases helped to better understand the contribution of each strategy on the final
outcome.
(ii) Using the “unpertubed” (or meanfield) limit as a reference point, the impact of migration
on the outbreak of cooperation in a spatially distributed system could be quantified. We
found that there is a bandwidth of optimal migration rates which lead to the induction
(or “export”) of cooperation to a number of islands which otherwise would converge to
defection. We were able to determine the critical conditions fKthr,m
K which guarantee the
outbreak of cooperation in a worst case scenario. Remarkably, the relative effort fthr/K to
export cooperation to defecting islands was decreasing with K in some range and always
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stayed below the critical value for an isolated island. I.e. effectively it became easier to turn
defecting into cooperating islands, provided the optimal migration rate was reached.
It is important to note that the outbreak of cooperation is not enforced by a maximal migration
rate but, as stated above, by a small range of optimal migration rates. This is because migration,
different from other approaches, is not seen as an unidirectional dynamics, where agents just
move to a “better” place. Instead, our model is based on the assumption that it is a bidirectional
process, which we deem a more realistic assumptions when considering a dynamics over many
generations. In fact, agents, or their offsprings, which have obtained certain skills or wealth at
their immigration country, quite often decide to start new buisness back home at their origin
country – because their new capabilities give them a considerable advantage there, while it is
only a marginal advantage in their immigration country. This assumption is in line with many
policies about immigration/education of foreigners in a country, to give indirect support for
development and to allow future business with those countries, where some agents with positive
experience have resettled. At the end, as we have shown in our paper, it remarkably helps to
spread “cooperation” globally, if the number of breeding places for such a strategy is increased
(above a minimum threshold).
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A Calculating the average payoff
In order to illustrate eq. (8), let us look at two agents i and j. If both of them play strategy z(1),
TFT, then, during the ng different “iterations” , their choices are as follows:
1 2 3 4 · · · ng
payoff a
(11)
i : R R R R · · · R
i (TFT ) : C C C C · · · C
j (TFT ) : C C C C · · · C
payoff a
(11)
j : R R R R · · · R
(19)
Consequently, the average payoff for both agents i and j is a
(11)
i = a
(11)
j = R. If agent i playing
TFT meets with an agent j playing strategy z(2) (ALL-D) the series of choices would be:
1 2 3 4 · · · ng
payoff a
(12)
i : S P P P · · · P
i (TFT ) : C D D D · · · D
j (ALL−D) : D D D D · · · D
payoff a
(21)
j : T P P P · · · P
(20)
which leads to an average payoff for agent i of a
(12)
i = [S + (ng − 1)P ]/ng, while the average
payoff for agent j is a
(21)
j = [T + (ng − 1)P ]/ng.
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If agent i playing A-TFT interacts with agent j playing ALL-D, the series of choices reads:
1 2 3 4 · · · ng
payoff a
(42)
i : P S S S · · · S
i (A− TFT ) : D C C C · · · C
j (ALL−D) : D D D D · · · D
payoff a
(24)
j : P T T T · · · T
(21)
That means the average payoff for agent i is a
(42)
i = [P +(ng− 1)S]/ng, while the average payoff
for agent j is a
(24)
j = [P + (ng − 1)T ]/ng. The remaining cases can be explained similarly. Only
the three more complex cases are given below. a
(14)
i follows from:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 · · ·
payoff a
(14)
i : S P T R S P T R · · ·
i (TFT ) : C D D C C D D C · · ·
j (A− TFT ) : D D C C D D C C · · ·
payoff a
(41)
j : T P S R T P S R · · ·
(22)
Here, the average payoff of agent i results from a repeated payoff series S P T R, and the value
of ng defines when this series is truncated. Similarly, the series for a
(41)
i is T P S R. Thus the
first term of a
(rq)
i , eq. (9) calculates all completed payoff series (ng div 4), while the second term
calculates the remaining payoffs (ng rem4).
For a
(44)
i , we find eventually:
1 2 3 4 · · ·
payoff a
(44)
i : P R P R · · ·
i (A− TFT ) : D C D C · · ·
j (A− TFT ) : D C D C · · ·
payoff a
(44)
j : P R P R · · ·
(23)
Here, the period of the payoff series is just 2 instead of 4, and the expression for a
(44)
i = a
(44)
j ,
eq. (9) follows accordingly.
B Two strategies: TFT and ALL-D
We assume that the population consists of only two strategies: z(1) =TFT and z(2) =ALL-D, eq.
(3). This is an interesting combination since defection is known to be the only equilibrium in an
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one-shot PD game, while TFT fares well in a repeated PD interaction, given there is a critical
number of encounters (discussed below).
The average payoff a
(rq)
i received by agent i playing strategy z
(q) (q ∈ 1, 2) results from eq. (8).
Choosing ng = 4 we find: [
a(11) a(12)
a(21) a(22)
]
=
[
3.0 0.75
2.0 1.0
]
(24)
Applying eqs. (4), (11), we find for the total average payoff:
a¯ = a(11)f (1)
2
+ (a(12) + a(21))f (1)f (2) + a(22)f (2)
2
(25)
On the other hand, it follows from the stationary condition (12):
a¯f (i) −
(
a(i1)f (1) + a(i2)f (2)
)
f (i) = 0 (i = 1, 2)
f (1) + f (2) = 1
(26)
The combined eqs. (25), (26) have to be solved simultaneously for the possible stationary fre-
quencies f (1), f (2). As the result we find:
(i) f (1) = 0, f (2) = 1 (stable)
f (1) = 1, f (2) = 0 (stable)
(ii) f
(1)
thr = 0.2, f
(2)
thr = 0.8 (for ng = 4) (unstable)
(27)
Solution (i) implies that either strategy ALL-D or TFT invades the population completely, which
are the two stable attractors of the system in the case of only two strategies. On the other hand,
solution (ii) describes the coexistence of the two strategies with different frequencies within the
total population. In the given case, it is is an unstable point attractor that separates the basins
of two stable attractors, and therefore acts as a separatrix here. I.e., for an initial frequency
f (1)(0) ≤ 0.2 of strategy z(1) =TFT, the dynamics of the system will converge into a stationary
state that is entirely dominated by strategy ALL-D (where the payoff per agent is a¯ = P = 1),
whereas in the opposite case the population will entirely adopt strategy TFT (average payoff
a¯ = R = 3).
The threshold value f
(s)
thr strongly decreases with the number of encounters ng, as shown in Fig.
2 for the case of four strategies. This raises the question about the critical ng for which TFT
could invade the whole population. Let us compare the average payoffs of the strategies z(1) =
TFT and z(2) = ALL-D:
a(1) =a(11)f (1) + a(12)f (2)
a(2) =a(12)f (1) + a(22)f (2)
(28)
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The respective values of a(rq) can be calculated from eq. (8) for different numbers of ng. We find
that only the elements a(12) and a(21) change with ng, as follows:
ng 1 2 3 · · ·
a(12) 0.0 0.5 0.677 · · ·
a(21) 5.0 3.0 2.333 · · ·
(29)
With a(11) = 3.0 and a(22) = 1.0, we find for ng = 1 that a
(21) > a(11), a(22) > a(12). This implies
that a(2) > a(1) for all possible initial frequencies of the two strategies in the population. Thus,
from the dynamics of eq. (5) (fitness-proportional selection) the extinction of the strategy TFT
results, in agreement with the known results. For ng = 2 we find a
(21) = a(11), a(22) > a(12),
which again implies that a(2) > a(1) for all possible initial frequencies of the two strategies in
the population, i.e. the extinction of strategy TFT. However, for ng = 3, we find a
(21) < a(11),
a(22) > a(12). Thus, there exist some initial frequencies of the two strategies for which a(1) > a(2)
results. I.e., we can conclude that for the given payoff matrix nthrg = 3 is the threshold value for
the number of interactions between each two agents that may lead to the invasion of cooperation
in the whole population.
C Three strategies: TFT, ALL-D and ALL-C
When strategy z(3) = ALL-C is added to the previous strategies z(1) = TFT and z(2) = ALL-D,
agents playing ALL-D will benefit from agents playing ALL-C. Therefore, if the frequency of
agents playing ALL-C is increased in the initial population, it can be expected that the basin of
attraction of the TFT strategy will shrink, while the basin of attraction of the ALL-D strategy
will grow, compared to the case of two strategies, discussed in B. The stationary frequencies have
now to be calculated from the following set of coupled equations that result from eqs. (4), (11)
and the stationary condition (12):
a¯ =
3∑
s=1
a(s)f (s) =
3∑
s=1
(
3∑
r=1
a(rs)f (r)
)
f (s)
a¯f (i) −
(
a(i1)f (1) + a(i2)f (2) + a(i3)f (3)
)
f (i) = 0 (i = 1, 2, 3)
f (1) + f (2) + f (3) = 1
(30)
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The matrix elements a(rq) can be calculated from eq. (8). With ng = 4 we find the following
stationary solutions:
(i) f (1) = 1, f (2) = 0, f (3) = 0 (stable)
f (1) = 0, f (2) = 1, f (3) = 0 (stable)
f (1) = 0, f (2) = 0, f (3) = 1 (unstable)
(ii) f
(1)
thr = 0.2, f
(2)
thr = 0.8, f
(3) = 0 (for ng = 4) (unstable)
f (1) = 1.0− f (3) (0 ≤ f (3) ≤ 1), f (2) = 0 (stable)
(31)
We note that a mean-field analysis of the three-strategy case was also dicussed in [24] and,
assuming extensions such as mutations and fluctuations, analysed further in [2, 9]. We consider
the deterministc case here. Solutions (i) imply that either strategy TFT or ALL-D or ALL-C
invades the entire population. We note that only the first two solutions are stable ones, while the
last point-attractor f (3) = 1, f (1) = f (2) = 0 is an unstable one, because any small pertubation
(i.e. the invasion of one defecting agent) will transfer the cooperating system into a defecting
one.
The first of the solutions (ii) describing coexisting strategies is already known from the investi-
gation in B to be an unstable one. In the absense of the third strategy, it defines the separatrix
point. The second solution (ii) however is a stable one, indicating that both agents playing TFT
and ALL-C can coexist in the panmictic population. Note that there is neither a stable nor an
unstable coexistence of all three strategies.
The separatix that divides the different basins of attraction is now a line in a two-dimensional
space of the initial frequencies. But different from B the stationary solutions of eq. (31) do
not give further information about the separatices. In order to calculate the different basins of
attraction, we therefore have numerically solved eq. (5) for the full range of initial frequencies:
0 ≤ f (1)(0) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ f (2)(0) ≤ 1, f (3)(0) = 1− f (1)(0)− f (2)(0), and have evaluated the average
payoff in the stationary limit. If a¯ = P , obviously the whole population has adopted strategy
z(2) = ALL-D. Similarly, if a¯ = R and f (1) = 1, the whole population has adopted strategy z(1) =
TFT. However, if a¯ = R and f (1) < 1, then there is a coexistence of agents playing strategy
z(1) = TFT and z(3) = ALL-C.
The basins of attraction are shown in Fig. 9 for two different values of ng = 4 and ng → ∞. In
the latter case, a(12) = a(21) = 1 results for the payoffs in eq. (8). For ng = 4 we can distinguish
between three different regions in Fig. 9. Region A denotes the range of initial frequencies f (s)(0)
that lead to the adoption of the z(2) = ALL-D strategy in the whole population, region B denotes
the range of initial frequencies that lead to the adoption of the z(1) = TFT strategy in the whole
population, while region C denotes the range of initial frequencies that lead to the coexistence
of both z(1) = TFT and z(3) = ALL-C strategies.
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Figure 9: Basins of attraction, i.e. range of initial frequencies f (s)(0) that lead to a particluar
stable solution, eq. (31). A: adoption of z(2) = ALL-D strategy in the whole population, B:
adoption of z(1) = TFT strategy in the whole population, C: coexistence of both z(1) = TFT
and z(3) = ALL-C strategies. f (3)(0) = 1− f (1)(0)− f (2)(0). (left) ng = 4, (right) ng →∞.
Since regions B and C both describe the adoption of cooperating strategies in the population,
the most interesting line in Fig. 9 is the separatrix between region A (all defectors) and region
B (all cooperators). We can easily interpret this line based on our previous analysis of the two-
strategy case, B. The diagonal in Fig. 9 represents f (1) + f (2) = 1, i.e. a population with only
two strategies, z(1) = TFT and z(2) = ALL-D. Thus the separatrix line between regions A and
B starts from the separatrix point f (1) = 0.2, f (2) = 0.8, f (3) = 0, eq. (31). Further below the
diagonal, the frequency f (3) of the strategy z(3) = ALL-C increases in the initial population,
which in turn increases the threshold frequency f (1) necessary for the invasion of the z(1) = TFT
strategy. In a certain range of frequencies, the separatrix line between defection and cooperation
can be described by a linear relation, found numerically as:
f (2) = −6.1538f (1) + 2.0308 for 0.2 ≤ f (1) ≤ 0.31 (32)
However, we notice that the separatrix line between regions A and B never hits the x-axis. For
very low values of f (2)(0), i.e. close to the x-axis, it makes a sharp turn towards the origin. This
means that for a vanishing initial frequency of ALL-D there will be no route to the respective
attraction region A, which is obviously correct.
The influence of the parameter ng is shown by comparing the left (ng = 4) and the right part
(ng =∞) of Fig. 9. In the latter case the basin of attraction A (exclusive domination of strategy
z(2) = ALL-D) becomes very small. In order to further quantify the influence of ng on the
dominating strategies in the stationary limit, we have also calculated the relative size of each
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basin of attraction. If FA, FB and FC denote the area of the regions A, B and C in Fig. 9, the
relative sizes are defined as follows:
a =
FA
Ftot
; b =
FB
Ftot
; c =
FC
Ftot
; d =
FB + FC
Ftot
; Ftot = FA + FB + FC (33)
The results are shown in Fig. 10 for the two different values of ng.
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Figure 10: Relative size, eq. (33) of the basins of attraction shown in Fig. 9. The left bars (shaded
area) refer to ng = 4 (Fig. 9 left), while the right bars (black area) refer to ng → ∞ (Fig. 9
right). Thus, the change indicates the influence of ng on the size of the basins of attraction.
In Fig. 10, d, eq. (33) denotes the relative size of the basin of attraction for cooperation resulting
from both solutions, domination of z(1) = TFT and coexistence of z(1) = TFT and z(3) = ALL-
C. As we see, for ng = 4, the cooperative basin d only has about the same size as the basin of
attraction for defection a, that mean that about half of the possible initial conditions will lead
to a population of defecting agents, at the end. Only for ng →∞ the size of the defection basin
becomes insignificant as compared to the cooperative basin. This again explains the role of ng
in influencing cooperation.
D Threshold frequencies for three and four strategies
In Section 4.3, we computed the critical conditions for the outbreak of cooperation (fKthr,m
K) in
the presence of only two strategies, ALL-D and TFT. If we consider the two additional strategies
ALL-C and A-TFT, eq. (3), these critical conditions change dependent on the initial values of
the four strategies and their distribution on the different islands. Thus, instead of a complete
investigations we only discuss the following sample configurations with
∑
s f
(s)
k (0) = 1:
(a) three strategies, TFT, ALL-D, ALL-C. f
(1)
1 (0) > 0, f
(2)
1 (0) = 1 − f
(1)
1 (0), f
(3)
2 (0) = 1,
f
(2)
k (0) = 1 with k ≥ 3.
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(b) four strategies, TFT, ALL-D, ALL-C, A-TFT. f
(1)
1 (0) > 0, f
(2)
1 (0) = 1− f
(1)
1 (0), f
(3)
2 (0) =
1, f
(4)
3 = 1, f
(2)
k (0) = 1 with k ≥ 4.
These initial conditions imply that K ≥ 3. The results of extensive calculations of the relative
effort fKthr/K and the critical migration rate m
K are shown in Fig. 11 and can be compared to
the two strategy case, eq. (17).
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Figure 11: (left) Threshold fKthr versus number of islands K. (right) Migration rate m versus
number of islands K. Migration can only promote cooperation if the number of islands is K ≤ 7
Again, we notice that the relative effort to invade other islands by agents playing TFT is non-
monotonously dependent on K and always stays below the threshold values observed without
migration, as given in Sect. 2.4, C. Regarding the impact of the different strategies on the
outbreak of cooperation, we see that in the presence of ALL-C ALL-D benefits more than TFT
in terms of payoff which raises the threshold frequency. However, adding A-TFT benefits ALL-
D less than adding ALL-C, which lowers the threshold frequency. This explains why the curve
for the four strategy case is in between the curves corresponding to two and three strategies.
From Fig. 11(right) the optimal migration rate is found to be almost constant for three and four
strategies in contrast to the two strategy case.
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